

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SE-41: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible UN/US Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Korean War

1. If judged as an estimate which between Thursday and Tuesday went through the entire process from initiation through agency coordination, this is a remarkable achievement, for which the O/NE Staff and the agency representatives deserve high commendation. If judged as the intelligence contribution to a policy decision which affects the vital interests of our country, it is a paper we should much prefer not to have prepared in this way. I speak, I am sure, for all concerned in stating that such estimates require time for sober discussion and reflection, and that a confirmation of the present pace involves the risk of serious errors of judgment.

2. On instructions from the Planning Board of the NSC, no effort was made to re-assess Communist capabilities or intentions in the light of the Communist proposal of 30 March concerning the PW issue.

3. State will probably insist on a footnote objecting to Paragraph 6 (the text of the footnote is on page 6). The other agencies felt that the present text of Paragraph 6, which was approved by the IAC only a few days ago in connection with NIE-30, should stand.

4. Air may drop the footnote to Paragraph 7, which is also on page 6.

5. Because of unavoidable haste in getting the text out to the IAC, a number of errors in wording have been noted. These errors have been corrected in the attached errata sheet.

Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates

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